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Applicability of Hickenlooper Amendment
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City Bank of New York
(N.Y.L.J. 8/25/70, p.1) that the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 19641 applied only to expropriated property marketed in
the United States or proceeds thereof.
The case arose as a result of a 1958 transaction under which First
National City made a loan to a corporate agency of the government of the
Republic of Cuba in the amount of $15,000,000, which was secured by
collateral held in New York. 2 Following the seizure of control by the
Castro forces on January 1, 1959, First National City renewed the loan
and Banco Nacional succeeded to rights and obligations of the loan pur-
suant to a law of the Castro government. The loan was renegotiated in
1960 and Banco Nacional repaid one-third thereof, leaving a principal
amount outstanding of $10,000,000.
In September 1960 the Cuban Government seized all branch offices of
*Member of the New York Bar. Assisted by A. Ronald Wilkor of the New York Bar.
122 USC § 2370 (e) (2), as amended 79 Stat. 658-59 (September 6, 1965): "(2) Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right of property is
asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this
subsection ......2The collateral consisted of United States government bonds and obligations of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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First National City in Cuba without providing any compensation. Shortly
thereafter First National City closed Banco Nacional's accounts and ad-
vised Banco Nacional that it had exercised its rights of lien and offset. It
also sold the collateral held in New York as security on the loan, from
which it received an amount substantially in excess of that required to
discharge the principal and interest of the loan.
Banco Nacional brought an action in November 1960 to recover the
excess received by First National City on the sale of the collateral held as
security for the loan. In February 1961 it amended its complaint to set
forth an additional cause of action for recovery of the deposits maintained
by nationalized Cuban banks with First National City in New York.
Judge Bryan of the District Court granted summary judgment for First
National City dismissing Banco Nacional's claim for the New York depos-
its of nationalized Cuban banks and denied summary judgment on the other
cause of action, but only because there were triable issues as to the
amount of First National City's offset. He held that First National City
was entitled to set-off any amounts due it from the expropriation of its
properties by the Cuban government against Banco Nacional's claim based
on the sale of the loan collateral.
Banco Nacional appealed the decision as to both causes of action but
pressed only that for the excess from the sale of collateral.
Judge Bryan based his decision on the Hickenlooper Amendment,
which, "for all practical purposes," had legislatively reversed the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Application of the act of state doctrine as
sustained in that decision would forbid judicial scrutiny by the courts of
one country of the validity of acts of the government of another, within its
own territory. Judge Bryan held, however, that he was compelled by the
Hickenlooper Amendment to disregard the act of state doctrine and to
determine the validity of the confiscation under international law. Since it
was a reprisal evincing discrimination against nationals of the United
States and because no adequate compensation was provided, the court held
that the expropriation did violate international law principles and that,
therefore, First National City was entitled to that offset it claimed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Agree-
ing with the District Court that the Sabbatino decision, by itself, would call
for the application of the act-of-state doctrine and, thus, rejection of First
National City's claims, the Court examined the legislative history behind
the Hickenlooper Amendment and reached a different conclusion from that
of Judge Bryan:
"if one fact is clear from the legislative history, it is that this language [the
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Hickenlooper Amendment] was designed to be invoked by American firms in
order to afford them 'a day in court'-and presumably a monetary recov-
ery-when some other entity attempted to market the American firms' ex-
propriated property and some aspect of such an attempted transaction took
place in this country. We cannot believe that through the same language
Congress intended to create a self-help seizure remedy for those few American
firms fortunate enough to hold or have access to some assets of a foreign state
at the time that state nationalized American property."
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals took the view that permitting an
offset in this situation would run counter to another important Congres-
sional policy, expressed in the system of claim submission and blocking of
assets of the International Claims Settlement Act of 19493 and the Trading
with the Enemy Act.4 Under this system, claimants such as First National
City are entitled to submit claims based on their expropriated property to
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Further, Congress and the
Executive Branch have acted pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act
to block all Cuban assets in the United States as of July 18, 1963. 5 If First
National City were to be permitted an offset, both these policies would,
according to the court, be frustrated with a resultant windfall to First
National City since proceeds from the sale of the collateral, representing
Cuban assets in this country, would not be blocked but would be retained
directly by the bank. The opinion concludes that, although at present there
is no statutory provision to this effect, should claims against the Cuban
government eventually be paid by the use of vested Cuban assets, First
National City would take a priority position at the expense of other
claimants and it would receive a substantial portion of its claim directly
through retention of assets which would Dever become part of the fund
available to all claimants on a pro rata basis.
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Consuls Reaffirmed
A Michigan court in Kita v. Matuszak, 175 NW 2d 551 (Mich. Ct.
App.- 1970), recently held that state courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction over a counterclaim against a foreign consul.
The consul general of Poland had brought an action in a state court as
attorney-in-fact for certain Polish nationals, alleging that defendant by
fraud and deceit had caused to be probated the will of his sister naming
3Pub. L. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110, amended Oct. 19, 1965; Pub. L. 89-262, sec. 1, 79 Stat.
988; Nov. 6, 1966; and Pub. L. 89-780, sec. 1, 80 Stat. 1365, 22 USC §§ 1643-1643k (1970
Supp.).
450 USC A. App. § 5 (1970 Supp.); Proc. 3447, 27 F.R. 1085, 3 C.F.R., 1959-1963
Comp.5See C.F.R. § 515, et seq., 1970.
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himself as sole legatee. Defendant counterclaimed for libel consisting of
false charges of criminal activity. The lower court denied plaintiff's motion
to strike the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 28
USC § 1351* granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal courts in all
civil actions, including counterclaims, affecting foreign consuls and
vice-consuls, with the exception of actions for divorce and alimony. In so
doing, the Court distinguished cases holding that jurisdiction to sustain
counterclaims exists, at least to the extent of any set-off, where actions are
instituted by foreign governments, since the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity is deemed to have been waived by bringing the action. First, these
cases did not involve such a jurisdictional statute as 28 USC § 1351
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal courts. Secondly, foreign
consuls do not share the privileged immunity of foreign nations, sovereign
states and ambassadors or other foreign ministers. Therefore, there is no
"sovereign immunity" to be waived by bringing an action in a state court.
Instead, the immunity enjoyed by consuls is limited to actions based on
acts committed by the consul within the scope of his official duties. Wheth-
er the particular act is within or without said scope is a question for the
federal courts to answer, pursuant to 28 USC § 1351. Thus, the exemption
of a consul from state jurisdiction, if it can be said to be a "privilege," is
one of the United States government to keep within the federal court
system those cases which might in any degree affect the foreign relations of
the United States.
Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is an absolute requirement of a
judicial proceeding, and since it cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or
waiver, the Court concluded that the lower court had erred in denying
plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Compulsion by Foreign Government
Held Complete Defense to Antitrust Action
It was held by a federal district court in Interamerican Refining Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.C. Del.- 1970), that
compulsion by foreign governmental authorities to boycott an American
corporation was a complete defense to an action under the United States
antitrust laws based on boycott.
Plaintiff Interamerican, a Delaware corporation, incorporated in October
*The [Federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of all actions and proceedings against consuls or vice-consuls of foreign states.
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1959, planned to process low-cost Venezuelan crude oil in a bonded
refinery in Bayonne, New Jersey, and to export products or sell them as
ship's bunker in New York Harbor, thus avoiding United States import
quota and tariff restrictions. In furtherance of this plan, Interamerican
rented and substantially modified a Bayonne refinery to meet its expected
needs. It also arranged to receive shipment of Venezuelan crude oil from
defendant-suppliers Monven and Texaco (formerly Supven), through the
efforts of defendant Amoco as trader.
After Interamerican had received three shipments pursuant to contracts
consummated under this arrangement, it was informed by Amoco that,
because the Venezuelan government had forbidden further sales, direct or
indirect, to Interamerican, Amoco was unable to obtain oil from its sup-
pliers and therefore could make no further shipments. Amoco tried, with-
out success, to secure other suppliers of suitable crude oil, and In-
teramerican attempted by various means to obtain Venezuelan crude oil
from other sources, but all suppliers refused to sell without the explicit
permission of the Venezuelan government. Finally, after obtaining one
more cargo of oil from Supven, Interamerican was forced to terminate its
operations.
Interamerican commenced a treble damage action against suppliers
Monven and Supven, trader Amoco, and Monsanto as responsible for the
conduct of its subsidiary Monven, alleging a conspiracy to destroy In-
teramerican's potentially profitable business and asserting that defendants'
refusals to deal with it established a violation of the antitrust laws. Defen-
dants did not deny either the refusals to deal or the fact of damage, but
based their defense on the fact that the Venezuelan government forbade
them to deal with Interamerican.
Before discussing the merits of the case, the court examined in some
detail its factual background in three respects: (1) the rather unhappy
relationship between two of Interamerican's chief stockholders and the
Venezuelan government; (2) the control exercised by the Venezuelan gov-
ernment over foreign oil concerns doing business there; and (3) In-
teramerican's peculiar situation in the oil industry in that it could transact
its business without regard to import quotas or tariffs so long as it sold only
for export or in New York Harbor, and, therefore, would sell at prices
lower than other companies subject to the tariffs and import quotas and
would sell entirely to foreign markets, both of which factors concerned the
Venezuelan government. The Court also alluded to the angry reaction of
Venezuelan authorities in the press during the initial stages of In-
teramerican's arrangement with defendants in 1960, as well as negotiations
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between Venezuelan government representatives and Interamerican's rep-
resentatives during the same period.
The Court concluded that defendants were compelled by the regulatory
authorities of Venezuela to boycott plaintiff and that such compulsion was
a complete defense to plaintiff's action under the antitrust laws based on
that boycott. Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment was
granted.
In coming to this conclusion, the court examined the law of compulsion.
There can be no dispute, it noted, that sovereignty includes the right to
regulate commerce within a nation and, when a nation compels a certain
trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. "Acts of business
become effectively acts of the sovereign." (307 F. Supp. at 1298). The
Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts
of foreign sovereigns, but rather of those committed by persons and corpo-
rations. Furthermore, anti-competitive practices compelled by foreign na-
tions are not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the
Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would put an end to commerce.
Were compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a
government order would have to choose one country or the other in which
to do business.
In addition, the Court rejected paintiff's argument that, even if com-
pulsion were a good defense, the acts of compulsion must be valid under
Venezuelan law. It held that the act of state doctrine, "based upon proper
concepts of sovereignty and separation of powers, commands that conduct
of foreign policy reside exclusively in the executive." (307 F. Supp. at
1299). Therefore, whether or not Venezuelan officials acted within their
authority and by legitimate procedures was not relevant to the matter at
hand.'
The Court further concluded that the facts indicated that this was a
proper case for summary judgment. Once governmental compulsion was
shown, and there was no evidence that said compulsion was sought or
induced by defendants, further examination was neither necessary nor
proper. Indeed, the effective demonstration of compulsion precluded an
inference of illegal conduct. When defendants explained their refusals to
sell with uncontradicted evidence of a legal excuse (compulsion), the bur-
den fell upon plaintiff to demonstrate issues of fact with respect to the
'In connection with the act-of-state question, the court rejected plaintiffs attempt to limit
the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964), to expropriation
decrees.
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explantions. Since no such issue was present on the record, the case was a
proper one for granting summary judgment to defendants.
Cuban Assets Control Regulations Upheld
In the case of Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F2d 833 (CA
D.C. - 1970), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the Secretary of the Treasury had the authority to block United States
assets of Cuban corporations under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
Appellants were Cuban refugees who owned 750 of the 1,000 out-
standing shares of Acueducto Yateritas, S.A. ("Yateritas"), a Cuban cor-
poration which supplied water to the United States naval base at Guanta-
namo Bay until February 6, 1964. Though appellants had left Cuba in
September of 1960 and lived in other places in the Western Hemisphere,
Yateritas continued to supply Guantanamo with water until its property
was seized and shut down by the Castro government on February 6, 1964.
Following a settlement agreement of past claims between Yateritas and the
United States Navy on October 22, 1965, monies were deposited in the
account of the corporation in a New York bank, which account was then
blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. An application
by Yateritas for a license from the Secretary of the Treasury to withdraw
the funds deposited in its New York account was denied and, thereafter,
separate license applications filed by each appellant in his capacity as
shareholder of Yateritas were also denied by the Federal Reserve Bank in
New York. Consequently, appellants brought this action seeking a judg-
ment (1) directing the Treasury Department and agencies thereunder to
license each of them to withdraw one-fourth of the balance in the corpo-
ration's New York bank account, and (2) declaring that the action of the
Treasury Department and its related agencies was unconstitutional be-
cause it deprived them of property without due process of law.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
the complaint and plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the District Court.
The Court of Appeals held, in the first place, that the blocking of the
United States assets of Yateritas was in accordance with the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, promulgated under the Trading With the Enemy Act,
as amended, which provides that, during a time of emergency, the Presi-
dent may prohibit the transfer of "any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has an interest" if the property is "subject to
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the jurisdiction of the United States."' Since the United States has
officially been in a state of emergency since 1950,2 the Secretary of the
Treasury validly invoked the statute when he issued the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations in 1963, which applied the statute's prohibitions to
transfers of property in which Cuba, as a designated country, or Cuban
nationals have "any interest of any nature whatever, direct or indirect." 3
Since the unblocking provision in the Regulations was inapplicable because
the property under consideration was owned by a Cuban corporation
active since the 1963 effective date, the blocking of the assets of Yateritas
in New York was held to be in accordance with the regulations duly
authorized by statute.
The Court then dismissed appellants' arguments with regard to con-
stitutionality. Though no standards are provided in the Trading With the
Enemy Act as to which country shall be "designated" thereunder, the
doctrine that a statute may not confer undue latitude in the President has
minimal force in the area of foreign relations. Exective officials acted
within the zone of their discretion when they concluded in 1963 that the
attitudes and activities of Cuba were so inimical to the interest of the
United States as to justify the prohibitions embodied in the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations.
Appellants also argued that they were not "blocked" Cuban nationals
and thus should be entitled to a proportionate share of the assets. The
Court stated that, in the first place, the situation under consideration
involved a blocking, rather than a vesting of assets. At such a point, the
courts should give latitude to Congress, in terms of time and substantive
determinations, to evolve a set of vesting provisions which it deems rea-
sonable in the light of a broad overview of the relevant circumstances.
Such circumstances might include the possible use of blocked assets to
satisfy American claims against Cuba, as well as any Cuban national
interest therein.
Furthermore, the Court noted that even if the government had unilat-
erally vested the assets involved, any claims of appellants based on illegal-
ity would encounter substantial problems, starting with the proposition that
the government may be able to accept the country of incorporation as
establishing the nationality of a corporation having assets within our bor-
ders without being required to pierce the corporate veil. In that case, the
entity involved would be a Cuban corporation, rather than a group of
non-Cuban shareholders.
150 U.S.C.A. App. § 5 (b).
250 U.S.C.A. App. p. 9 (190).
331 C.F.R. § 515.201 (b)-(d)(1969).
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Finally, with regard to the argument that the government had uncon-
stitutionally discriminated against aliens, the Court alluded to "an historic
enclave of the law" which established that a state or country may marshal
local assets for the benefit of local creditors before claims of creditors
outside the state or nation are realized. Pursuant to this principle, the
Court concluded that alien stockholders have no constitutional objections
to a preference given to American stockholders in the marshaling of Amer-
ican assets, at least where the following circumstances are present: (1) the
preference is given in the context of a blocking program; (2) Congress has
not yet spelled out its permanent program, even assuming for discussion
that the blocking is a forerunner to vesting; and (3) recognition of the
alien's constitutional right to participate on equal terms in American assets
would convert the character of the liquidation from one that is partial and
temporary to one that is absolute and permanent.
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